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Abstract
In this paper, we study a two-sector CES economy with sector-specific
externality as described by Nishimura and Venditti [5]. We characterize
the equilibrium paths in the case that allows negative externality as that
equlibrium paths were not explicitly discussed by Nishimura and Venditti.
We show how the degree of externality affects the local behavior of the
equilibrium path around the steady state.
1 Introduction
This paper characterizes the local behavior of the equilibrium paths around the
steady state in a two-sector model with CES production functions and sector-
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specific externality. It is well known that externalities may cause indeterminate
equilibrium paths in an infinite horizon model. Benhabib and Farmer [1] have
shown that indeterminacy could occur in a one-sector growth model with both
externality and increasing returns. In their model, the production function has
constant returns to scale from the private perspective, while it has increasing
returns to scale from the social perspective. Since then, there have been many
papers about the existence of indeterminate equilibria in dynamic general equi-
librium models. However, until Benhabib and Nishimura [2, 3], most of the
literature dealt with models in which the production function has increasing
returns to scale from the social perspective. They proved indeed that inde-
terminacy may arise in a continuous time economy in which the production
functions from the social perspective have constant returns to scale. Benhabib,
Nishimura and Venditti [4] then studied a discrete-time two-sector model with
sector-specific external effects. They assumed that each sector has a Cobb-
Douglas production function with positive sector-specific externalities, that are
a special case of CES functions, and there is an infinitely-lived representative
agent with a linear utility function. Under these assumptions, they provided
conditions in which indeterminacy may occur even if the production functions
have decreasing returns to scale from the social perspective. Nishimura and
Venditti [5] consider a CES economy with sector-specific external effects and
partial depreciation of capital. They study the interplay between the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution and the rate of depreciation of capital, and its in-
fluence on the local behavior of the equilibrium paths in the neighborhood of
the steady state.
In this paper, we study the Nishimura and Venditti [5] model, focussing on
the external effect of the capital-labor ratio in the pure capital good sector and
characterize the equilibrium paths in the case that allows negative externality.
That particular scenario was not explicitly discussed by Nishimura and Venditti.
We assume indeed that the externality is given by the capital stock per capita.
Such a formulation then implies that for a given level of capital, the externality
from labor is negative. We demonstrate that the degree of externality affects
the local behavior of the equilibrium path around the steady state.
In Section 2 we describe the model. We discuss the existence of a steady
state and give the local characterization of the equilibrium paths around the
steady state in Section 3. Section 4 contains some concluding comments.
2 The Model
We consider a two-sector model with an infinitely-lived representative agent.
We assume that its single period linear utility function is given by
u (ct) = ct.
We assume that the consumption good, c, and the capital good, y, are produced
with a CES technology.
2
ct =
[
α1K
−ρc
ct + α2L
−ρc
ct
]− 1ρc , (1)
yt =
[
β1K
−ρy
yt + β2L
−ρy
yt + et
]− 1ρy
, (2)
where ρc, ρy > −1 and et represents the time-dependent externality in the
investment good sector. Let the elasticity of capital-labor substitution in each
sector be σc = 11+ρc ≥ 0 and σy = 11+ρy ≥ 0. We assume that the externalities
are as follows:
et = bK¯
−ρy
yt − bL¯−ρyyt , (3)
where b > 0, and K¯y and L¯y represents the economy-wide average values. The
representative agent takes these economy-wide average values as given.
Definition 1 We call y =
[
β1K
−ρy
y + β2L
−ρy
y + e
]− 1ρy the production function
from the private perspective, and y =
[
(β1 + b)K
−ρy
y + (β2 − b)L−ρyy
]− 1ρy the
production function from the social perspective.
In the rest of the paper we will assume that α1 + α2 = β1 + β2 = 1. Thus,
if βˆ1 = β1 + b and βˆ2 = β2 − b, then βˆ1 + βˆ2 = 1.
Remark 1 Notice that the externality (3) may be expressed as follows
e = bL¯−ρyy
[(
K¯y
L¯y
)−ρy
− 1
]
. (4)
Now consider the production function from the social perspective as given in
Definition 1. Dividing both sides by Ly, we get denoting ky = Ky/Ly and
y˜ = y/Ly
y˜ =
[
(β1 + b) k−ρyy + (β2 − b)
]− 1ρy . (5)
From equations (4) and (5) we derive that the externality is given in terms of
the capital-labor ratio in the investment good sector. This implies that for a
given level of capital K¯y, the externality from labor L¯y is negative.
The aggregate capital is divided between sectors,
kt = Kct +Kyt,
and the labor endowment is normalized to one and divided between sectors,
Lct + Lyt = 1.
The capital accumulation equation is
kt+1 = yt,
3
Thus capital depreciates completely in one period. To simplify the formulation,
we assume that both technologies are characterized by the same properties of
substitution, i.e. ρc = ρy = ρ.
The consumer optimization problem is given by
max
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
α1K
−ρ
ct + α2L
−ρ
ct
]− 1ρ
s.t. yt =
[
β1K
−ρ
yt + β2L
−ρ
yt + et
]− 1ρ
1 = Lct + Lyt
kt = Kct +Kyt
yt = kt+1
k0, {et}∞t=0 given
(6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. pt, rt, and wt respectively denote the
price of capital goods, the rental rate of the capital goods and the wage rate
of labor at time t ≥ 0.1 For any sequences {et}∞t=0 of external effects that the
representative agent considers as given, the Lagrangian at time t ≥ 0 is defined
as follows:
Lt =
[
α1K
−ρ
ct + α2L
−ρ
ct
]− 1ρ + pt [[β1K−ρyt + β2L−ρyt + et]− 1ρ − kt+1]
+ rt (kt −Kct −Kyt) + wt (1− Lct − Lyt) .
(7)
Then the first order conditions derived from the Lagrangian are as follows:
∂Lt
∂Kct
= α1
(
ct
Kct
)
− rt = 0, (8)
∂Lt
∂Lct
= α2
(
ct
Lct
)
− wt = 0, (9)
∂Lt
∂Kyt
= pβ1
(
yt
Kyt
)
− rt = 0, (10)
∂Lt
∂Lyt
= pβ2
(
yt
Lyt
)
− wt = 0. (11)
From the above first order conditions, we derive the following equation,(
α1upslopeα2
β1upslopeβ2
)
=
(
KctupslopeLct
KytupslopeLyt
)1+ρ
. (12)
1We normalize the price of consumption goods to one.
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If α1/α2 > (<)β1/β2, then the consumption (capital) good sector is capital
intensive from the private perspective.
For any value of (kt, yt) , solving the first order conditions with respect to
Kct, Kyt, Lct, Lyt gives inputs as functions of capital stock at time t and t+ 1,
and external effect, namely:
Kct = Kc (kt, yt, et) , Lct = Lc (kt, yt, et) ,
Kyt = Ky (kt, yt, et) , Lyt = Ly (kt, yt, et) .
For any given sequence {et}∞t=0, we define the efficient production frontier
as follows:
T (kt, kt+1, et) =
[
α1Kc (kt, yt, et)
−ρ + α2Lc (kt, yt, et)
−ρ
]− 1ρ
.
Using the envelope theorem we derive the equilibrium prices2.
T2 (kt, kt+1, et) = −pt, (13)
T1 (kt, kt+1, et) = rt. (14)
Next we solve the intertemporal problem (6). In this model, the lifetime
utility function becomes
U =
∞∑
t=0
δtT (kt, kt+1, et) .
From the first order conditions with respect to kt+1, we obtain the Euler equa-
tion
T2 (kt, kt+1, et) + δT1 (kt+1, kt+2, et+1) = 0. (15)
The solution of equation (15) also has to satisfy the following transversality
condition
lim
t→+∞ δ
tktT1 (kt, kt+1, et) = 0. (16)
We denote the solution of this problem {kt}∞t=0. This path depends on the
choice of the sequence {et}∞t=0. If the sequence {et}∞t=0 satisfies
et = bKy (kt, yt, et)
−ρ − bLy (kt, yt, et)−ρ , (17)
then {kˆt}∞t=0 is called an equilibrium path.
Definition 2 {kt}∞t=0 is an equilibrium path if {kt}∞t=0 satisfies (15), (16) and
(17).
2See Takayama [6] for the envelope theorem, pp160-165. Using the envelope theorem, we
get ∂Lt
∂kt
= ∂T
∂kt
and ∂Lt
∂kt+1
= ∂T
∂kt+1
. This is equivalent to (13) and (14).
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Solving equation (17) for et, we derive et as a function of (kt, kt+1), namely
et = eˆ (kt, kt+1). Let us substitute eˆ (kt, kt+1) into equations (13) and (14) and
define the equilibrium prices as
pt = pt (kt, kt+1) ,
rt = rt (kt, kt+1) .
Then the Euler equation (15) evaluated at {kt}∞t=0 is
−p (kt, kt+1) + δr (kt+1, kt+2) = 0. (18)
3 Steady State and Local Stability Properties
Definition 3 A steady state is defined by kt = kt+1 = yt = k∗ and is given by
the solution of T2 (k∗, k∗, e∗) + δT1 (k∗, k∗, e∗) = 0 with e∗ = eˆ (k∗, k∗) .
In the rest of the paper we assume the following restriction on parameters’
values that guarantees all the steady state values are positive.
Assumption 1 The parameters δ, β1, b and ρ satisfy
(δβ1)
−ρ
1+ρ < β1 + b.
From the proof given in Nishimura and Venditti [5], we can obtain the steady
state value.
Proposition 1 In this model, there exists a unique stationary capital stock k∗
such that:
k∗ =
{
1 +
(
α1β2
α2β1
) −1
1+ρ
(δβ1)
−1
1+ρ
[
1− (δβ1)
1
1+ρ
]}−1 [
1−βˆ1(δβ1)
−ρ
1+ρ
βˆ2
] 1
ρ
. (19)
To study the local behavior of the equilibrium path around the steady state
k∗, we linearize the Euler equation (15) at the steady state k∗ and obtain the
following characteristic equation
δT12λ
2 + [δT11 + T22]λ+ T21 = 0,
or
δλ2 +
[
δ
T11
T12
+
T22
T12
]
λ+
T21
T12
= 0. (20)
As shown in Nishimura and Venditti [5], the expressions of the characteristic
roots are as follows:
6
Proposition 2 The characteristic roots of equation (20) are
λ1 =
1
(δβ2)
1
1+ρ
[(
β1
β2
) 1
1+ρ −
(
α1
α2
) 1
1+ρ
] , (21)
λ2(b) =
(δβ2)
1
1+ρ
[
β1+b
β1
(
β1
β2
) 1
1+ρ − β2−bβ2
(
α1
α2
) 1
1+ρ
]
δ
.
The roots of the characteristic equation determine the local behavior of the
equilibrium paths. The sign of λ1 is determined by factor intensity differences
from the private perspective.3
Remark 2 The capital/labor ratio externality, i.e. the negative labor exter-
nality, implies that the characteristic root λ2(b) in Proposition 2 is larger than
the corresponding characteristic root from Nishimura and Venditti [5].
We now characterize the equilibrium paths in this model. In particular we
can show that the local behavior of the equilibrium path around the steady state
changes according to the degree of external effect in the capital good sector.
Definition 4 A steady state k∗ is called locally indeterminate if there exists ε >
0 such that for any k0 ∈ (k∗ − ε, k∗ + ε), there are infinitely many equilibrium
paths converging to the steady state.
As there is one pre-determined variable, the capital stock, local indetermi-
nacy occurs if the stable manifold has two dimensions, i.e. if the two character-
istic roots are within the unit circle. We will also present conditions for local
determinacy (saddle-point stability) in which there exists a unique equilibrium
path. Such a configuration occurs if the stable manifold has one dimension, i.e.
if one root is outside the unit circle while the other is inside.
When the investment good is capital intensive, local indeterminacy cannot
occur. However, depending on the size of the externality, saddle-point stability
or total instability may occur.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the capital good sector is capital intensive from
the private perspective, i.e. α2β1 > α1β2. The following cases hold:
(i) If ρ ∈ (−1, 0), there is b (δ) > β2 such that the steady state is a saddle
point for b ∈ [0, b (δ)) and is totally unstable for b > b (δ) .
(ii) If ρ = 0, the steady state is a saddle point for b ∈ [0, β2) and is totally
unstable for b > β2.
(iii) If ρ > 0, there exists 0 < δ2 < 1 and 0 < b (δ) < β2 such that when
δ ∈ (δ2, 1) , the steady state is a saddle point for b < b (δ) and is totally unstable
for b > b (δ). When δ ∈ (0, δ2), the steady state is totally unstable.
3If α2β1−α1β2 > 0, the capital good sector is capital intensive from the private perspective.
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Proof. Notice that λ1 > 0 and define δ1 ≡ β−12
[
(β1/β2)
1
1+ρ − (α1/α2)
1
1+ρ
]−1−ρ
>
1.4 From this we obtain λ1 = (δ1/δ)
1
1+ρ > 1 for any δ ∈ (0, 1). Since (β1 +
b)/β1 > 1 and (β2 − b)/β2 < 1, λ2(b) is always positive. Thus λ2(b) is an in-
creasing function of b. For b = 0, we get λ2 (0) = δ−
ρ
1+ρ δ
− 11+ρ
1 and for b = β2,
we have λ2 (β2) = (δβ1)
−ρ
1+ρ .
(i) If −1 < ρ < 0, 0 < λ2 (0) < 1 and λ2 (β2) < 1. Therefore there is
b (δ) > β2 such that 0 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) , and λ2 (b) > 1 for
b > b (δ) .
(ii) If ρ = 0, 0 < λ2 (0) = δ−11 < 1 and λ2 (β2) = 1. Therefore λ2 (b) < 1 for
b < β2 and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > β2.
(iii) If ρ > 0, 0 < λ2 (0) < 1 for δ2 < δ < 1 and λ2 (0) > 1 for δ ∈ (0, δ2)
with δ2 = δ
− 1ρ
1 . Moreover λ2 (β2) > 1. Therefore if δ lies in (δ2, 1) , there is
b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) such that λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ) .
If δ lies in (0, δ2) , then λ2 (0) > 0 and λ2 (β2) > 1, and therefore λ2 (b) > 1 for
all b > 0.
Remark 3 Consider the production function from the social perspective as
given in Definition 1 and recall from equation (5) that we can express it as
follows
y˜ =
[
(β1 + b) k−ρyy + (β2 − b)
]− 1ρy . (22)
According to b ≷ β2, the following inequality holds: for any η > 1,[
(β1 + b) (ηky)
−ρ + (β2 − b)
]− 1ρ ≷ [(β1 + b) (ηky)−ρ + η−ρ (β2 − b)]− 1ρ
= η
[
(β1 + b) k−ρy + (β2 − b)
]− 1ρ
If b is larger than β2, the function y˜ exhibits increasing returns. If b is smaller
than β2 the function y˜ exhibits decreasing returns. Note that larger values of b
contribute to have total instability.
Next we present our results assuming that the capital good is labor intensive
from the private perspective, i.e. α2β1 − α1β2 < 0. This case results in local
indeterminacy. By rewriting equation (21), the characteristic roots are,
λ1 = − 1
(δβ2)
1
1+ρ
[(
α1
α2
) 1
1+ρ −
(
β1
β2
) 1
1+ρ
] , (23)
λ2(b) = −
(δβ2)
1
1+ρ
[
β2−b
β2
(
α1
α2
) 1
1+ρ − β1+bβ1
(
β1
β2
) 1
1+ρ
]
δ
.
4Note that δ1 = α2
h
(α2β1)
1
1+ρ − (α1β2)
1
1+ρ
i−1−ρ
> α2
(α2β1)
= 1
β1
> 1.
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To get λ1 ∈ (−1, 0), we need however to suppose a slightly stronger condition
than simply ensuring the capital good sector to be labor intensive from the
private perspective. The capital intensity difference α1β2 − α2β1 needs to be
large enough and the discount factor has to be close enough to 1.
Proposition 4 Assume that (α1β2)
1
1+ρ − (α2β1) 11+ρ > α
1
1+ρ
2 and δ ∈ (δ3, 1)
with δ3 = β−12
[
(β1/β2)
1
1+ρ − (α1/α2)
1
1+ρ
]−1−ρ
< 1. Then the following cases
hold:
(i) If ρ ∈ (−1, 0), there exist b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) and b (δ) > β2 such that the
steady state is a saddle point for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) ∪ (b (δ) ,+∞) and is locally inde-
terminate for b ∈ (b (δ) , b (δ)).
(ii) If ρ = 0, the steady state is a saddle point for b ∈ (0, β2 − 2α2)∪(β2,+∞)
and is locally indeterminate for b ∈ (β2 − 2α2, β2) .
(iii) If ρ > 0, there are b (δ) and b (δ) in (0, β2) such that the steady state
is a saddle point for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) ∪ (b (δ) ,+∞) and is locally indeterminate for
b ∈ (b (δ) , b (δ)) .
Proof. If (α1β2)
1
1+ρ−(α2β1) 11+ρ > α
1
1+ρ
2 and δ ∈ (δ3, 1), then −1 < λ1 < 0. The
size of λ2(b) is determined in the following way. Recall that λ2(b) is increasing
in b. For b = 0, λ2 (0) = 1/δλ1 < −1 by the above hypothesis and for b = β2,
λ2 (β2) = (δβ1)
−ρ
1+ρ .
(i) If −1 < ρ < 0, λ2 (β2) < 1. Therefore there exist b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) and
b (δ) > β2 such that λ2 < −1 for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) , −1 < λ2 < 1 for any b ∈(
b (δ) , b (δ)
)
and λ2 > 1 for any b > b (δ) .
(ii) If ρ = 0, λ2 (β2) = 1. Therefore λ2 (b) < −1 for b ∈ (0, β2 − 2α2) ,
−1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈ (β2 − 2α2, β2) and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > β2.
(iii) If ρ > 0, λ2 (β2) > 1. Therefore there exist b (δ) and b (δ) in (0, β2) such
that λ2 (b) < −1 for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) , −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈
(
b (δ) , b (δ)
)
, and
λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ) .
Notice that intermediary values for b are necessary to get local indeterminacy.
Indeed, values of b that are too small or too large imply saddle-point stability.
Remark 4 In Proposition 4 we consider restrictions implying that the first
characteristic root λ1 is negative and larger than −1. These restrictions also
imply that the second characteristic root is such that λ2(0) < −1. As the
characteristic root λ2(b) is an increasing function of b, a large enough (but not
too large) amount of externalities ensures the existence of local indeterminacy.
Building on Remark 2, we also derive that local indeterminacy is more likely
in our framework than in that of Nishimura and Venditti [5] in the sense that
their framework requires a larger amount of externalities.
Next we still assume that capital goods are labor intensive from the private
perspective with α2β1−α1β2 < 0, but we make λ1 an unstable root, i.e. λ1 < −1.
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Two cases need to be considered: (α1β2)
1
1+ρ −(α2β1) 11+ρ > α
1
1+ρ
2 and δ ∈ (0, δ3),
as well as (α1β2)
1
1+ρ − (α2β1) 11+ρ < α
1
1+ρ
2 .
Proposition 5 Suppose that the capital good sector is labor intensive from the
private perspective and let δ4 = β
1
ρ
2
[
(β1/β2)
1
1+ρ − (α1/α2)
1
1+ρ
] 1+ρ
ρ
.
1 - If (α1β2)
1
1+ρ − (α2β1) 11+ρ > α
1
1+ρ
2 and δ ∈ (0, δ3), the following results
hold:
(i) Let ρ ∈ (−1, 0). If δ ∈ (0, δ4), then there exist b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) and
b (δ) > β2 such that the steady state is a saddle point for b ∈
(
b (δ) , b (δ)
)
and is
totally unstable for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) ∪ (b (δ) ,+∞). If δ ∈ (δ4, δ3), then there exists
b (δ) > β2 such that the steady state is a saddle point for b ∈
(
0, b (δ)
)
and is
totally unstable for b > b (δ).
(ii) Let ρ = 0. Then the steady state is a saddle point for b ∈ (β2 − 2α2, β2)
and is totally unstable for b ∈ (0, β2 − 2α2) ∪ (β2,+∞).
(iii) Let ρ > 0. Then there exist b (δ) , b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) such that the
steady state is a saddle point for b ∈ (b (δ) , b (δ)) and is totally unstable for
b ∈ (0, b (δ)) ∪ (b (δ) ,+∞).
2 - If (α1β2)
1
1+ρ − (α2β1) 11+ρ < α
1
1+ρ
2 , the following results hold:
(i) Let ρ ∈ (−1, 0). Then there exists b (δ) > β2 such that the steady state
is saddle point for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) and totally unstable for b > b (δ).
(ii) Let ρ = 0. Then the steady state is saddle point for b ∈ (0, β2) and
totally unstable for b > β2.
(iii) Let ρ > 0. If δ ∈ (0, δ4), then there exist b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) and b (δ) > β2
such that the steady state is saddle point for b ∈ (b (δ) , b (δ)) and totally unstable
for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) ∪ (b (δ) ,+∞). If δ ∈ (δ4, 1), then there exists b (δ) > β2 such
that the steady state is saddle point for b ∈ (0, b (δ)) and totally unstable for
b > b (δ) .
Proof. We assume here that λ1 < −1. Recall that λ2(b) increases with b.
Moreover, for b = 0, we get λ2 (0) = −δ−
ρ
1+ρ δ
− 11+ρ
3 , with δ3 as defined in
Proposition 4, and for b = β2, we get λ2 (β2) = (δβ1)
−ρ
1+ρ . We easily get λ2 (0) ∈
(−1, 0) if and only if δρ > δ−13 . As shown above, two cases have to be considered:
1 - Let (α1β2)
1
1+ρ − (α2β1) 11+ρ > α
1
1+ρ
2 and δ ∈ (0, δ3) with δ3 < 1.
(i) When −1 < ρ < 0, we get λ2 (β2) < 1, and λ2 (0) < −1 if and only if
δ < δ
− 1ρ
3 ≡ δ4. It follows then that δ4 < δ3 as δ
− 1+ρρ
3 < 1. We conclude that
λ2 (0) < −1 if 0 < δ < δ4, while λ2 (0) > −1 if δ ∈ (δ4, δ3). Therefore if δ lies
in (0, δ4) , there exist b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) and b (δ) > β2 such that λ2 (b) < −1 for
b ∈ (0, b (δ)) , −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈
(
b (δ) , b (δ)
)
, and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ).
If δ lies in (δ4, δ3) , there exists b (δ) > β2 such that −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for
b ∈ (0, b (δ)) and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ) .
(ii) If ρ = 0, λ2 (0) < −1 and λ2 (β2) = 1. Therefore −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for
b ∈ (β2 − 2α2, β2) and λ2 (b) > 1 for b ∈ (0, β2 − 2α2) or b > β2.
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(iii) If ρ > 0, then δ4 > δ3 and thus λ2 (0) < −1 for any δ ∈ (0, δ3).
Moreover λ2 (β2) > 1. Therefore, there exist b (δ) and b (δ) in (0, β2) such that
λ2 (0) < −1 for b ∈ (0, b (δ)), −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈
(
b (δ) , b (δ)
)
and λ2 (0) > 1
for b > b (δ).
2 - Let (α1β2)
1
1+ρ − (α2β1) 11+ρ < α
1
1+ρ
2 . In this case we have δ3 > 1.
(i) When −1 < ρ < 0, λ2 (β2) < 1. Moreover, we get δρ > 1 > δ−13 so
that λ2(0) > −1. Then there exists b (δ) > β2 such that −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for
b ∈ (0, b (δ)), and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ).
(ii) If ρ = 0, −1 < λ2 (0) < 0 and λ2 (β2) = 1. Therefore −1 < λ2 (b) < 1
for b ∈ (0, β2) and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > β2.
(iii) If ρ > 0, then λ2(0) > −1 if and only if δ > δ−
1
ρ
3 ≡ δ4 with δ4 < 1 and
thus λ2 (0) < −1 for any δ ∈ (0, δ4). Moreover λ2 (β2) > 1. Therefore if δ lies in
(0, δ4) , then there exist b (δ) ∈ (0, β2) and b (δ) > β2 such that λ2 (b) < −1 for
b ∈ (0, b (δ)), −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈
(
b (δ) , b (δ)
)
, and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ). If
δ lies in (δ4, 1) , there exists b (δ) > β2 such that −1 < λ2 (b) < 1 for b ∈ (0, b (δ))
and λ2 (b) > 1 for b > b (δ) .
Notice that the impact of b on the local stability properties of the steady
state depends on the value of the discount factor δ. If δ is not too small, larger
values of b contributes to total instability as in Proposition 3 (see cases 1-i) with
δ ∈ (δ4, δ3) and 2-iii) with δ ∈ (δ4, 1) in Proposition 5). On the contrary, if δ
is close enough to zero, local instability is obtained for low enough and large
enough values of b.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have characterized the local dynamics of the equilibrium paths
depending on the size of the external effects b. We have shown that when
the investment good is capital intensive, large values of b contributes to total
instability. When the consumption good is capital intensive, the effect of b on the
local dynamics of the equilibrium path is more complex. If the capital intensity
difference is large enough, local indeterminacy occurs for intermediary values of
b while saddle-point stability is obtained when b is low enough or large enough.
If the capital intensity difference is small, local indeterminacy cannot occur and
the role of b depends on the size of the discount factor. When the discount
factor is not too low, larger values of b again contributes to total instability.
However, when the discount factor is close enough to zero, total instability is
also obtained for small values of b. In this case indeed, saddle-point stability
requires intermediary values of b.
In this paper, we have assumed that both sectors have the same elasticity of
capital-labor substitution. It would be interesting to study the characterization
of the equilibrium paths by introducing heterogeneity.
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